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ABSTRACT 
 
Professors, teachers and school administrators are increasingly faced with concerns not even 
thought of in previous decades.  For example, drugs, weapons, suicides, robberies, and assaults are 
now everyday occurrences in some educational facilities.  Being able to cope with such situations 
requires care and some knowledge of the law.  In addition, the danger to school employees can go 
even further, such as personal financial liability in the form of damage law suits by students against 
the school and its employees.  Obviously, the thought of an educator losing personal assets and 
retirement pay because of only trying to protect other students or one’s own self is daunting.   
 
 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
 
he Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  However, many school and university 
administrators operate under the belief that students have few (if any) constitutional rights in the 
school setting.  Unfortunately for these administrators, such feelings are no longer valid. 
 
Without question, schools have both a right and a duty to provide a safe environment conducive to learning.  
Some years ago, courts looked at school officials as acting on behalf of the student‟s parent.  Therefore, school 
officials were considered to be a private party not subject to the Fourth Amendment (Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 
715).  However, times have changed in recent years, and now courts view the school officials as state governmental 
employees who are agents of the government and are therefore bound by the Fourth Amendment.  Bellnier v. Lund , 
438 F.Supp 47, are subject to the U.S. Civil Rights Act, as amended, and other laws, including exposure to personal 
financial liability for violating students‟ rights. 
 
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that students do not “shed their constitutional rights…at the 
schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733).  
Clearly, then, school officials are paid employees of the state and must comply with all provisions of the United States 
Constitution.  The U.S. Supreme Court has further said that ”it is indisputable” that the Fourth Amendment protects 
the rights of students against encroachment by public school officials (New Jersey v. TLO, 469 US 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 
720, 105 S. Ct. 733).  The reason for this dramatic change in the law is that courts have recognized that parents do not 
voluntarily yield their parental authority over to the schools because education is compulsory and parents have no 
choice in the matter (Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US 651, 97 S.CT. 1401, 51 L.Ed.2d 711).  Furthermore, the US 
Supreme Court has gone so far as to state “that the schools are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 
scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source 
and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes” (West Virginia State  Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178). 
 
The Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of any container that conceals the contents from 
plain view (US v. Ross, 456 US 798, 72 L.Ed.2d 572, 102 S. Ct. 2157).  In one ruling, the courts stated that “a search 
of a child‟s person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out on 
T 
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an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy (T.L.O. supra).  In another case, the 
courts found that “students often carry items of a personal or private nature in their pockets and bags, and many 
students (whether or not they are carrying contraband) must surely feel uncomfortable or embarrassed when officials 
decide to rifle through their personal belongings” (Doe v. Little Rock School District, 380 F.3d 349, 8 th Cir 2004). 
 
REASONABLENESS OF THE SEARCH 
 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, but rather proscribes unreasonable searches.  
(Footnote:  The Fourth Amendment goes on further to specify requirements for search warrants, etc., but this study 
addresses only the validity of searches conducted without a court-issued search warrant.)  “The legality of a search of 
a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search” (T.L.O., supra. at p. 
341).  As an additional reference, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.CT. 1868, and also see Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 US at 326. 
 
“A search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating 
either the law or the rules of the school.  Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are 
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction” (T.L.O., supra at p. 342).  The reasonableness of the search of the student by 
school officials, however, involves a two part inquiry:  (1) whether the search was justified in its inception; and (2) 
whether the search was reasonable in scope in light of the age and sex of the student and the intrusiveness of the 
search. 
 
Part One:  Justified in its Inception 
 
The term “justified in its inception” has been interpreted to mean that “a search is warranted only if the 
student‟s conduct creates a reasonable suspicion that a particular regulation or law has been violated with the search 
serving to produce evidence of that violation” (Bridgman v. New Trier High School 128 F.3d 1146).  Furthermore, 
what is reasonable suspicion has become the subject of numerous court opinions.  It is well settled that “reasonable 
suspicion” requires more than a good faith effort or minimal restraint on the part of the school official.  Simply stated, 
the Constitution does not permit good intentions to justify objectively improper intrusions on student privacy (Bellnier 
v. Lund, supra). 
 
When a question as to reasonableness comes before the courts, it is the school administrator that has the 
burden to establish the student‟s conduct was such that it created a reasonable suspicion that a specific rule or law had 
been violated and that a search could reasonably be expected to produce evidence of that violation (Cales v. Howell  
Public Schools, 635 F.Supp 454).  While the evidence required to support a search of students might be somewhat less 
than that probable cause required for a police officer to obtain a search warrant in a non-educational setting, there 
must still be some credible evidence to authorize a reasonable search.   
 
The circumstances justifying a search must be recent in time to the search and of such a nature as to indicate 
a more or less “guilty conscience” on the part of the suspected student.  “This aspect of the case evokes some concern 
because school teachers and administrators can marshal negative incidents and perceptions while discounting any 
contrary evidence that may accumulate over the course of a number of months or longer” (Cornfield v. Consolidated 
High School Dist 230, 991 F.2d 1316). 
 
Examples of unconstitutional searches, where the courts struck down a search by school officials, include a 
situation where a teacher and police officer were investigating the theft of money.  Although they had no reason to 
know which of some 30 students might have taken the money, all thirty students were searched.  Ultimately, the 
money was not found (Bell v. Marseilles Elementary School Dist.  2001, U.S. Dist LEIS 2367, Illinois 2001).  In 
another example, a student was seen in the school parking lot attempting to avoid detection by ducking behind a 
parked car when she was supposed to be in class.  The school security guard confronted her and she gave a false 
name.  At the school office, she was made to empty her pockets where “re-admittance slips” were improperly found in 
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her possession.  Then she was taken to a bathroom where she had to remove her jeans and bend over so a teacher 
could visually inspect the contents of her brassiere (Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F.Supp 454). 
 
Examples of constitutional searches, where the courts upheld the search by school officials, include a 
situation where a student identified another student to a teacher as someone he had just seen possess cigarettes in 
violation of school rules (Rudolph v. Bd of Education, 242 F. Supp 2d 1107, Alabama 2003).  As an additional 
reference, see Thomas v. Clayton, 94 F Supp 2d 1290. 
 
Part Two:  Reasonable in Scope in Light of the Student and Intrusiveness 
 
A teacher had reason to believe someone in her classroom had stolen money ($3.00) from another student, 
but she had no evidence as to which student might have done it.  This teacher caused all students to empty their purses 
and pockets and remove their shoes.  When this failed to produce the stolen money, the teacher took each student into 
the restroom where the students were made to strip to their underclothes. The search was found to be unconstitutional 
(Bellnier, supra). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated that “as the intrusiveness of the search of a student 
intensifies, so too does the standard of Fourth Amendment reasonableness” (Cornfield v. Consolidated High School 
District No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316).  Furthermore, any evidence that does justify the search of purses, pockets and 
lockers, will likely fall far short of justifying a “strip search.”   
 
REASONABLE CAUSE 
 
Courts take the position that “we balance the Fourth Amendment rights of individual students with the 
interest of the state and the school officials in the maintenance of a proper educational environment to educate today‟s 
youth.  A school official or teacher‟s reasonable search of student‟s person does not violate the student‟s Fourth 
Amendment rights, if the school official has reasonable cause to believe the search is necessary in the furtherance of 
maintaining school discipline and order, or his duty to maintain a safe environment conducive to education”  (Tarter v. 
Raybuck 742 F.2d 977).   In addition, it might be added that is “if” certain major precautions are taken. 
 
 In addition, the Supreme Court has gone farther when it said “that the schools are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the 
free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes” (West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L. Ed 1637).  The standards the 
Supreme Court applies to school searches are essentially the same as in criminal cases away from the school campus.  
Specifically, the standards are: (1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes; (2) the character 
of the intrusion; (3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue; and (4) the efficacy of the means 
employed in meeting that concern (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S. Ct., 1868). 
 
STRIP SEARCHES 
 
Strip searches present serious problems for the courts.  In Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, the court held “it 
does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search…is an invasion of constitutional rights of 
some magnitude.  It is a violation of any known principal of human decency.”  The court went on to call a strip search 
“outrageous under „settled indisputable principles of law.‟” 
 
For the most part, courts have consistently required the following three rules in strip searches of all students.  
First, strip searches are not justified without individualized suspicion unless there is a legitimate safety concern (such 
as weapons). Secondly, school officials must be investigating allegations of violation of the law (or school rules) and 
only individual accusations justify a strip search.  Finally, strip searches must be designed to be minimally intrusive, 
taking into account the item for which the search is conducted. 
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CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
 
The Civil Rights Act, as amended, provides that individuals acting under “color” of state law can be 
personally liable when their actions violate the civil rights of individuals.  In this sense, “color” means that the 
individual was acting in some official governmental capacity in an area where he or she had legal right to act (42 
U.S.C. Section 1983).  If the student sues the school district and the individual teacher(s) or administrator(s) 
personally at the same time, the trend is to dismiss the lawsuit against the individuals as being redundant to the main 
suit against the school (Jungels v. Pierce, 825 F.2d 1127). 
 
At the same time, if the individuals acted unlawfully, the governmental entity will not be held liable, unless 
the individuals were executing a governmental policy or custom when the wrong act was done (Monel v. Dept of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 128 L.Ed.2d 470).  Even then, the policy or custom being carried out 
must be shown to be the proximate cause of the supposed constitutional deprivation.  Additionally, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has said that the single isolated incident of wrongdoing by a non-policymaker is generally insufficient to 
establish municipal acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct (Tuttle 471 U.S. 823, 105 S. Ct 2436).  Courts generally 
look for a series or pattern of unconstitutional conduct in order to hold the governmental entity liable. 
 
It is not necessary for a student to wait until an unconstitutional policy of a school district is wrongfully 
applied to a specific situation, as there can be standing to challenge a policy that is currently in effect and capable of 
being applied even though it has never been applied in the past (Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 
289, 60 L.Ed.2d 895, 99 S. Ct. 2301).  Furthermore, the fact that a teacher violated a constitutionally protected right of 
a student does not of itself automatically make the school board or even the school district liable for the teacher‟s 
misconduct.  The legal doctrine of “respondeat superior” does not apply here.  The liability of the school board (or the 
school district or municipality, or any other governmental agency for that matter) must rest entirely on the unlawful 
conduct of the governmental agency itself, not simply on the illegal conduct of one of its employees, such as the 
teacher (Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 89 L.Ed.2d 452, 106 S. Ct. 1292). 
 
PERSONAL LIABILITY 
 
Whether a strip search is involved or not, if a school official‟s conduct violated any known constitutional 
protection of the student, that official can be held personally liable for the breach of that particular constitutional 
protection.   To win damages from a school official, the student must show that the official was personally responsible 
the deprivation of the constitutional right.  Also, the student must show that the law was sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official in his position would have known that what he was doing violated that constitutionally protected 
right (Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523).   
 
However, the student needs to show several things: (1) that the law was settled enough that the school official 
should have known that his conduct would violate the Constitution, and (2) that the official knew about, approved, 
condoned or turned a “blind eye” to the unconstitutional conduct (Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F3d 1422). 
 
SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
 
A school administrator has management and monetary interest in what his/her employees are doing while on 
the job or on the school premises.  Under general employment law, employees owe a duty of loyalty to the employer, 
as does the employer to the employee (Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515, 1999).  This 
duty gives the employer a vital, as well as legal, interest in what is going on in and about his/her premises 
(Lochenmyer v. Didrickson, 636 N.E.2d 93, 98, Ill. App. Ct., 1994).  Since the employer is not a criminal investigator, 
he/she is given wider latitude when it comes to conducting searches of his/her own business areas (Stoker v. State, 788 
S.W.2d 1, 11, Tex. Crim. App., 1989).  However, this right does not extend to searching an employee‟s home. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As was stated previously, professors, teachers and school administrators are increasingly faced with 
situations, such as drugs, weapons, robberies, and assaults, which were not common concerns in prior decades.  
However, being able to cope with such situations requires extreme care, and often knowledge of the law, as actions by 
school employees can often result in personal financial liability in the form of damage law suits by students against 
the school and its employees.  This study examined some of the complexities involved and offered some possible 
alternatives in addressing those complexities. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
 
For additional reading on this subject, please see the following cases:  Anders v. Ft. Wayne Community 
Schools, 124 F.Supp 2d 618 (Indiana 2000);  Bell v. Marseilles Elementary School Dist, 2001 U.S. Dist LEIS 2367 
(Illinois 2001);  Bundick v. Bay City School Dist,140 F.Supp 2d 735 (Texas 2001);  Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 
11 F.Supp 2d 177 (Rhode Island 1998);  Cornfield v. Consolidated High School Dist 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7
th
 Cir 
1993);  Doe v. Little Rock School District, 380 F.3d 349 (8
th
 Cir 2004);  Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7
th
 Cir 1980);  
Earls v. Bd. of Education, 242 F.3d 1264, (10
th
 Cir 2001);  Horton v. Good Creek Independent School Dist, 677 F.2d 
471 (5
th
 Cir 1982);  Levett v. Bd of Education, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9650 (Illinois  2000);  O‟Meara v. City of 
Chicago, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18063 (Illinois 1999);  Phaneup v.  Cipriano, 330 F.Supp 2d 74 (Connecticut 2004);  
Rudolph v. Bd of Education, 242 F. Supp 2d 1107  (Alabama 2003);  Shade v. City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054 (8
th
 
2002).  Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d  977 (6
th
 Cir 1984);  Thomas v. Clayton, 94 F Supp 2d 1290 (Georgia 1999);  
Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950 (11
th
 2003);  and Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 379 F.3d 358 (6
th
 Cir 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of College Teaching & Learning – October 2006                                                            Volume 3, Number 10 
 6 
NOTES 
 
